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ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS BY CONDUCT

ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE BY CONDUCT
By L. W.

H

FEEzF.R*

the theory of a bill of exchange in the very early
days of its international use by merchants trading between
England and the continent was that the drawer has funds in the
hands of the drawee. That is, he has a right of action at common law against the drawee.1 This would be in form usually an
action in assumpsit or perhaps sometimes in debt. The drawer
at the same time owes and desires to pay an existing debt which
he owes the payee or perhaps he wishes to execute a contract with
the payee which will involve a money obligation on his part. At
any rate the drawer for some reason desires to make a transfer of
money or credit to the payee. This drawer may wish to make
the transfer in this indirect way either because he has no ready
money with which to make payment or for reasons of convenience
he wishes to make payment by transferring to the payee a credit
against the drawee.
The common law did not permit the assignment of choses in
action. 2 Trade could not prosper under such a restriction and the
merchants devised their own rules for dealing with such transactions and the bill of exchange of the merchants at length found
recognition in the common law courts.3 The common law courts
ISTORICALLY

*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, S. D.
18 Corpus Juris 810. "The most usual remedy at common law and
indeed the only one which was formerly available against remote
parties, is an action of assumpsit which lies in favor of an indorsee
or transferee against the maker, the acceptor or drawer." See cases
cited 8 C. J. 810, note 60.
"Suit was brought in assumpsit upon a foreign bill of exchange,
alleging in effect, by a fiction of factorage or agency, that the defendant, acceptor of the bill, had, at the hands of his foreign factor,
received money from the plaintiff, in consideration whereof he, now,
in accqpting the bill drawn by his factor for the purpose, promised
to repay
the same." Bigelow, Bills, Notes and Checks 3.
2
It does not seem necessary to cite at length the early authorities
for this point or the many modern cases referring to it obiter dictum. Suffice it to say that the foot notes, 5 C. J. 846 collect a large
number of them.
3
See Norton, Bills and Notes, 4th ed., 2, note 2, for collection of
cases. Burdick, 2 Col. L. Rev. 470; Note to Mandeville v. Riddle,
(1803) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 290, in 1 Rose's Notes to U. S. Rep. 160.
But it was during the Chief Justiceship of Lord Mansfield 1756 et
seq., that the principles of the law merchant came to be cordially
and fully received into the jurisprudence of the common-law courts
of England.
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having undertaken to enforce the contracts embodied in a bill
of exchange by the application to them of the law merchant, there
resulted in effect the equivalent of an assignment of one class
of choses in action which could be enforced by the assignee in
courts of law. But before this form of assignment was complete so as to enable the payee of a bill of exchange to bring his
action directly against the drawee in his own name even with the
application of the law merchant it was necessary that the drawee
should accept the draft or bill, or, in other words assent to the
assignment. Of course the payee or other holder of the bill, if
he held it bona fide for value, had his action against the drawer
in case of non-acceptance. 4 But the result contemplated by the
drawing and negotiation of a bill of exchange was not liability of
the drawer to the payee, but acceptance and later payment by the
drawee and finally discharge of the drawer. The drawee might
of course assent to the order by paying it outright as well as by
accepting for future payment, subject of course to the terms of
the bill.
Under what circumstances does it become possible for the
holder of a bill of exchange to enforce liability upon the drawee
thereof ? It has just been stated that he must assent to the order
which the bill contains. Whether or not he has in fact or at least
in law assented may sometimes be a difficult question to answer.
According to the law merchant an acceptance might be expressed
in words or implied from the conduct of the drawee. It might
be oral or written, it might be on the bill itself or on a separate
paper. 5 It might postdate the presentation of the bill or even
antedate its drawing, and it was not long after the introduction of
telegraphic communication before that means of indicating assent
was recognized. 6 However, in nearly if not quite all countries, the
liberal rules developed under the theory of the law merchant have
been restricted by statute.7 But there seems always to have been
a reluctance on the part of the courts to accept and receive at
their apparent or obvious face meaning in an ordinary and nontechnical sense the restrictions of the statutes in this matter. This
tendency, which appears in many recent cases decided under the
4
Such
5

is of course the rule at present under N. I. L. section 61.
Here again it does not seem necessary to cite specific authority
or cases as collected in the foot notes in the various encyclopedias and
texts. But see Thulin, Form of the Acceptance, 14 Mich. L. Rev.
455.
61
7 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments 496.
McClaren, Bills, Notes and Checks, 5th ed., 110.
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Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, is not new. A statute
passed in the time of Queen Anne, which was intended to require
a written acceptance of inland bills of exchange, was held not to
0
have that effect."
Prior to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, statutes
were in force in a considerable number of American states which
provided for a written acceptance. In the absence of statute,9
however, a verbal acceptance was sufficient and the agreement
which it constituted was not within the statute of frauds.' 0
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an acceptance of a bill of exchange shall be in writing." It does not go
to the more cautious extreme of the English Bills of Exchange
Act which requires that the acceptance must be upon the bill of
exchange itself' 2 (although it does authorize the holder to require
this if he so desires),' 8 and it has left some leeway for at least one
form of the implied or constructive acceptance formerly recognized by the law merchant.
Section 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law specifically
provides for one form of acceptance by conduct. "By reason of
the unfortunate language in which it is couched and the unwillingness of many courts to abandon their pre-statutory rule on the
point covered,"' 4 this section instead of promoting uniformity has
produced greater confusion on the question of implied or constructive acceptance. The dispute as to the law under section 137
is as to whether the drawee to whom is presented a bill for acceptance may be charged as acceptor under that provision if he
does nothing, or whether there must be a demand for a return of the bill and a refusal. In other words the question under
this section of the statute is whether mere failure to return the
bill is equivalent to a refusal to return it and so constitutes ac53 & 4 Anne c. 9. See McClaren, Bills, Notes and Checks, 5th
ed., 110, citing Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, (1726) 1 Str. 648; Lumley v.
Palmer, (1735) 2 Str. 1000; Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 3 Burr.
1663. Later the Act 1 & 2 George IV c. 78 was passed to make
written acceptances necessary.
OThulin, Form of the Acceptance, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 455.
loBigelow, Bills, Notes and Checks, 2nd ed. 58; 8 C. J.302 and
note 75.
"Section 132 N. I. L.
"2B. E. F. section 17 (1). See on the history of this requirement
in England, Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, 4th ed., p. 830.
"3N.
I. L., section 133 .
' 4 See McKusick, Uniformity and the Negotiable Instruments
Act. 9 Marquette L. Rev. 217. "There are a number of obstacles to
be met in securing uniformity of law; first the inexpert drafting of
statutes."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ceptance. 1 The weight of authority seems to be that mere retention is not acceptance and a number of jurisdictions having earlier
statutes similar or equivalent to section 137 have cases which hold
that mere retention is not enough.'6 0
The supreme court of Minnesota has dealt with this question in
the case of Miller v. Farmers'State Bank of Arco.17 In this case
one Howe drew a check October 15th on the defendant bank, payable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff received it on October 17th or
18th and deposited it at once in another bank. It reached the
defendant bank on October 20th through ordinary collection chan-,
nels. It was not paid and on Octover 25th it was returned by the defendant bank to the plaintiff without protest, Howe, the drawer of
the check, who was also the president of the defendant bank, after
the check had thus been returned, sent his own note to the plaintiff
for the amount involved. The plaintiff sued the defendant bank
as drawee-acceptor and it was held that the retention of the check
by the defendant in excess of twenty-four hours was an acceptance
ard that the plaintiff might recover from the defendant on that
theory.
There was no showing of a demand for the return of the
check or of a refusal by the defendant to return it. On the contrary, the defendant voluntarily returned it and the acceptance, if
any, consisted wholly in the mere retention of the check more than
twenty-four hours. The court refers to the conflict of authority
on the question and says that it follows the Pennsylvania view
citing Wisner v. First National Bank.' 8 The opinion does not
refer to the fact that Pennsylvania abandoned the rule of the
Wisner Case by statutory enactment some sixteen years before
the instant case was decided in Minnesota.' 9 Moreover the Min15 This section of the N. I. L. reads: "Where a drawee to whom
a bill is delivered for acceptance, destroys the same or refuses within
twenty-four hours after such delivery, or within such other period
as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted
to the8 holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same."
' Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 596.
Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 4th ed., 838-842; 8 C. J.
319. An adequate summary of the state of the authorities will be
found in the note at 10 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 529.
'7(1925) 165 Minn. 339, 206 N. W. 930. The case has been very
recently followed and cited in Clark v. N. P. Ry., (N.D. 1927) 214
N. W. 33, in which case no reference is made to the existence of
any contrary authority whatsoever.
18(1908) 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1266.
19 Penn. Laws 1909, Act 169, adds to section 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the following, "Provided, That the mere reten-
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nesota case takes no notice of the fact that the instrument in
Miller v.Farmers' State Bank of Arco was a check and not a private inland bill of exchange. This distinction has been made and
it has been held that even thbugh mere retention by the drawee
of a private bill of exchange might amount to an acceptance, this
would not be the rule in the case of a bank check.2 0 Nor does
the instant case make any reference to section 150 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which states that where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted within the prescribed
time, the person presenting it must treat the bill as dishonored by
non-acceptance. It would seem that not only by its own provisions does section 137 fail to make mere retention operate as an
acceptance but that taken along with section 150 it is intended to
be understood as meaning that acceptance must be something more
than mere inaction upon the part of the drawee.2" Furthermore
the Minnesota interpretation involves adopting a position contrary
to what was the prevailing rule in this country prior to the uniform
statute. It is of course well recognized that it was not the intention of the draftsmen of the Negotiable Instruments Law to change
but rather to codify the law of bills and notes as it existed, except
where the language of the statute left no room for doubt on that
point.
tion of such bill by the drawee, unless its return has been demanded,
will not amount to an acceptance; And provided further, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to checks."
20Whitewater Savings Bank v. U. S. Bank, (1922) 224 Ill. App.
26, in which it was held that under sections 131, 184, and 188, N. I. L.
there could be no implied acceptance of a check. 8 C. J.319. The
reason given for taking this distinction as to checks is that it is customary to hold checks in the drawee bank in many cases for the
accommodation of customer-depositors until they are covered by deposits.
But in Com. State Bank of Fort Worth v. Harkrider-Keith-Cook
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 250 S.W. 1069 it was held that tinder section 185 N. 1. L. defining a check as a bill of exchange drawn on a
bank, and which makes applicable thereto the provisions applicable
to a bill of exchange drawn on demand, except as otherwise provided,
section 137 N. I. L. does apply to checks, so that a bank on which the
check was drawn, is liable to the payee if it fails to pay the check
for lack of funds and then does not return it within 24 hours after it
was presented to the bank.
The case of Wisner v. First National Bank, (1908) 220 Pa. 21,
68 Atl. 955, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1266, was also followed in Peoples
National
Bank v. Swift, (1916) 134 Tenn. 175, 183 S.W. 725.
21
1t should be noted that "destruction" of a bill as referred to in
section 137 N. I. L, means a wilful and not a mere accidental one.
Bailey v. Southwestern Veneer Co., (1916) 126 Ark. 257, 190 S. W.
430.
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So much for acceptance in Minnesota by the drawee's retention of the bill. The Minnesota courts, having "gone the limit"
in the matter of implied acceptance under section 137 might be expected consistently to be generous in other respects in protecting
the interests of the bona fide holder of a bill of exchange as against
the drawee who had not actually accepted it formally in writing
but whose conduct was subject to construction as amounting to
acceptance. Indeed such has been the result in one class of cases
in Minnesota.
The type of case which it is proposed to consider as an instance of liability in the nature of an implied acceptance is well
illustrated by FirstNational Bank of McClusky v. Rogers-Amundsen-Flynn Co. 2 2 There was an understanding between a stock
buyer and the plaintiff bank where he was a regular customer that
funds to pay checks issued to farmers for livestock purchased
would be provided out of the proceeds of drafts drawn by the
stock buyer on the defendant, a live-stock commission firm in
South St. Paul. In spite of notice of this arrangement, the defendant drawee after receiving a certain shipment of livestock and
after selling it and receiving the proceeds with notice of the outstanding draft, did not accept or pay the draft drawn upon it but
credited the proceeds of the shipment to apply upon a formerly
existing debt due from the shipper. It was held that the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff.
There are not a great many cases involving the precise question
raised in the McClusky Bank Case and the few are not all in accord. However, as the question therein presented relates to a type
of business transaction which is very common both here and in
other jurisdictions, the fact that Minnesota seems to have settled
upon the position taken in the McClusky Bank Case as indicated
by subsequent decisions following it, may have some weight in establishing the rule more widely.
Contra to the McClusky Case and practically on all fours with
it is Johnson v. Clarke decided in Indiana in 1898.23 In this case
a livestock dealer named Vestal bought a lot of cattle, sent them
to a commission merchant for sale and drew a sight draft on the
commission merchant, as he had been in the habit of doing, being
at the time indebted to the commission merchant for overdrafts
previously made. The bank receiving the draft for collection gave
the commission merchant notice thereof and the commission mer22(1922) 151 Minn. 243, 186 N. W. 575.
23(1898) 20 Ind. App. 247, 50 N. E. 762.
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chant in turn agreed to inform the bank in the afternoon whether
he would accept the draft. In the meantime the commission merchant sold the cattle and after reimbursing himself from the proceeds for the amount due him for the overdraft of the drawer,
paid the balance to the holder of the draft and notified the bank
that he would not accept the draft. It was held that the sale of the
cattle, even with the knowledge of the draft, under the circumstances did not amount to an-acceptance of the draft and that the
commission merchant was not liable to the holder for the payment
2 4

of the draft.

The more recent case of Carlson a,. Stafford (Gillis Bros. Garnishee)2 5would seem to indicate that the Minnesota court is satisfied with the result in the McClusky Bank Case. In this recent
case, one Stafford sold certain forest products to Gillis Bros., and
he bought a team from Jameson to be used in hauling' out his logs.
Stafford then gave to Jameson an order, negotiable in form, upon
Gillis Bros., for the price of the team. A copy of this was sent to
Gillis Bros., but they did not accept in writing.
Subsequently the plaintiff as a creditor of Stafford served a
garnishee summons on Gillis Bros., but they nevertheless thereafter paid to Jameson the balance due Stafford under the apparently negotiable order previously referred to. The trial court held
that this payment would not protect the Gillis Bros., in the garnishment because the order held by Jameson was an unaccepted
bill of exchange. The report of the case brings out that Jameson
24The Indiana court says: "It must be remembered that the
cattle were delivered to the defendants by Vestal before they had
knowledge of the draft." In the Minnesota case the draft arrived and
was brought to the defendant for acceptance before he received the
cattle. In both cases the parties contemplated a draft against a consignment of cattle in accordance with an established custom of dealing, which was known also to the bank which bought the draft from
the shipper. And what is really significant is that the defendant in
both cases took possession of the shipment and sold it and received
the proceeds. Now he either did this because he had a right to do so
under a contract of factorage, as suggested by the Indiana court, or
because he had a right to help himself to the payment of an antecedent debt owing to him by the shipper or he converted them, or,
lastly, he took them as a purchase which he intended to pay for by
the acceptance of the draft, which he knew from his course of dealing
with the shipper to be outstanding.
The Indiana court says: "When a debtor has delivered to his
creditor the amount due him, or has placed in his hands the means
by which it may be realized zeitholut condition, the debtor loses the right
of preference." But query, was there a condition in these cases, established
by the practice between the consignor and consignee which gave the creditor notice of its existence, namely the condition of acceptance of the draft.
It is submitted that the cases are contradictory.
25(1926) 166 Minn. 481, 208 N. W. 413.
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sold the team in reliance on this order26 and upon Gillis Bros., oral
assurance that they would pay it out of any balance due Stafford.
The Minnesota supreme court says that as between Jameson
and the defendant Stafford, Jameson would prevail in recovering
from the Gillis Bros., and that the plaintiff as creditor of Stafford
stands in his shoes and therefore cannot recover from Gillis Bros.,
in the garnishment. The opinion also states that if Gillis Bros.,
had refused to pay Jameson on the ground of this being an unaccepted bill of exchange, Jameson could have invoked the doctrine
of estoppel and, moreover, that even if no written order had been
given to Jameson the agreement involving the three parties would
have operated as an equitable assignment. The court further
says of equitable assignment that the rule, that a draft (not drawn
on a particular fund and accepted) is not an assignment, has exceptions, where there is proof of facts which show that the parties
intended that the draft should operate as an assignment and the
drawee had notice thereof and assented, and that in such cases
the law will give effect to the intent of the parties.
The next case to be noted is Ballard v. Home National Bank
of Arkansas City27 in which one Stewart was buying live stock
and was accustomed to give checks on the defendant bank, later
giving the bank his notes to covet the amounts paid out by the
bank on such checks. The bank finally refused to continue this
arrangement, but its president agreed to let Stewart go on drawing checks in this way if the proceeds of the sale of livestock
so purchased should be deposited before the checks were paid.
Stewart thereafter bought mules of the plaintiff and gave his
checks therefor, marked, "for mules," sold the mules and deposited
the proceeds which were sufficient to cover the checks. However the bank instead of paying these checks credited the amount
of the proceeds of the mules upon Stewart's old debt to it. It
was held that the bank was liable to the check holders.
In Nebraska there are at least two cases which deserve notice.
In Grue-nther v. Bank of Monroe2 8 the plaintiff, as payee of a
check upon the defendant bank, telephoned to the drawee and
asked if it was good and was told that it was. Subsequently the
drawer took out all of his deposit except the exact amount sufficient to cover this check. The bank however refused to pay the
check on the ground of having made a mistake in its oral state26
See reference to this point, page 135.
27(1913) 91 Kan. 91. 136 Pac. 935, L. R. A. I916C 161.
28(1911) 90 Neb. 280, 133 N. V. 402.
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ment that the check was good. Now of course an oral telephone
statement alone is not an acceptance under the Negotiable Instruments Law, but it was held that under the circumstance$ of this
case the bank was liable to the payee of the check.2 9 In another
Nebraska case, Farmer's State Bank of Kramwr v. Aksamit,30
hay was shipped to one of the defendants and a bill of lading
and draft sent to the plaintiff bank. The consignee gave his check
to the plaintiff collecting bank and got possession of the draft and
bill of lading. Then within an hour he stopped payment on his
check on the ground that the hay was not in good condition. He
was held liable to honor the draft. The court says:
"None of this (the defective quality of the hay) excused the
defendant from the performance of his legal duty to honor the
sight draft which became a valid and subsisting obligation against
him when he obtained it and the bill of lading from the plaintiff
and retained possession of both instruments.' 'M
There is a recent Missouri case where liability must be rested
upon the same grounds as in these other cases notwithstanding
that the instrument in the Missouri case was not negotiable. This
is Southern . Creosoting Co. v. Chicago & Alton Railway,12 in
which the plaintiff sold material to a railroad contractor who
gave a draft on the defendant, upon whose job he was using the
material. In several letters the defendant agreed (so the court
finds) to pay the draft and did make a partial payment. The
defendant was held liable for the balance due on the draft. In
commenting upon this case,3 3 Professor Chafee points out: 1. that
the draft was not negotiable although the court overlooks that
fact; 2. that on the assumption that the draft was negotiable the
decision violated section 132 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
in that there was not acceptance in writing; 3. that there was no
acceptance under section 134 of the Negotiable Instrument Law
defining when an acceptance may be made on a paper other than
the draft itself, since the payee did not take it in reliance on the
drawee's promise. The case would seem to be of legitimate interest in the present discussion because the court, having treated the
2OProf. Chafee says in his fourth edition of Brannan's Negotiable
Instruments Law, 825: "The opinion of the dissenting judges is to
be preferred."
330(1924) 112 Neb. 465, 199 N. W. 733.
lJones v. Crumpler, (1916) 119 Va. 143, 89 S. E. 232 should be
noted as possibly contra to the case of Farmers State Bank of Kramer
v. Aksamit,
(1924) 112 Neb. 465. 119 N. WV. 733.
32
(Mo. 1918) 205 S. W. 716.
33
Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 4th ed., 825.
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instrument as though it were negotiable and subject to the Negotiable Instruments Law, proceeds to the statement that:
"An implied acceptance is any act which clearly indicates an
intention to comply with the request of the drawer, or any conduct of the drawee from which the holder is justified in drawing
the conclusion that the drawee intended to accept the instrument
and intended to be so understood."
The court also indicates its point of view by citing cases bearing
upon the problem of constructive acceptance by retention of a
draft and to the effect that the general concept of constructive
acceptance was not affected by the Negotiable Instruments Law.34
Was the doctrine of constructive acceptance affected by the
Negotiable Instruments Law? That would seem to be precisely
the point upon which all these cases must turn. And what does
the doctrine of constructive acceptance include (if anything) besides the matter of retention or destruction of the draft by the
drawee as referred to in Section 137 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law? In the cases just presented it will be noticed that it is not
the retention of the draft by the drawee that annoys the plaintiff.
It is the retention of goods, credit, money or something of value
previously belonging to or controlled by the plaintiff and later
put into the hands of the drawee, and against which transfer of
value the draft has been drawn. These cases are not covered
by Section 137 of the Negotiable. Instruments Law. If they are
correctly decided there is in the law another kind of constructive
acceptance than that defined in Section 137 or for some other
reason they are not covered by Sections 132, 134 and 135.
There is another recent case which seems worth noticing at
this point. There are two states which have (wisely, it seems
to the writer) omitted Section 137 from their statute relating to
negotiable instruments, viz, Illinois and South Dakota. Now is it
to be taken that in these states, which, instead of providing for
one type of constructive acceptance, have omitted all statutory
34

The court says in the course of its opinion, "The order is treated
by the parties as a bill of exchange, mere retention would not be
acceptance," but (quoting Ogden on Negotiable Instruments) "an implied accep~tance is any act which clearly indicates an intention to
comply with the request of the drawer or any conduct of the drawee
from which the holder is justified in drawing the conclusion that the

drawee intended to accept the bill and intended to be so understood."

It also affirms the idea that the doctrine of constructive acceptance
was not affected by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Query, Is not this court after all thinking in terms of estoppel
and would it be willing to extend this doctrine to a situation wherein
it could not find what it would be satisfied to regard as furnishing
the elements of an estoppel?
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reference to it, the doctrine nevertheless exists? An interesting
case has been decided in South Dakota, one of the two states mentioned. The case is further different from those in Minnesota and
the other jurisdictions from which previous illustrations have been
taken. In these cases we have been dealing with consignments
of commodities sent by freight to be sold to or by the drawee of
the draft. What about a case where the "goods" drawn against
is money or credit, viz., a bank credit placed at the disposal of the
drawee of the instrument upon which the suit is based, by the
drawer, and with such drawee's knowledge that a draft has been
or wil be drawn for reimbursement of the drawer or other party
who entered or transferred such funds or credit or performed some
similar banking transaction, placing funds or credit at the disposal
of the drawee. In the case of First State Bank of Lemmon v.
Stockmiets State Bank of Faith,35 a draft had been drawn in

Montana on a customer of the defendant bank. This customer,
however, lived in Lemmon, the location of the plaintiff bank.
The defendant's cashier went to Lemmon and had a conference
with the customer and with officers of the plaintiff bank. It
appeared that the customer had, to the plaintiff's knowledge, .that
day sent to the defendant bank items for deposit, sufficient to
cover the Montana draft. So the customer made his check on
the defendant for the amount of the Montana draft and gave it to
the defendant's. cashier. This cashier at once turned this check
over to the plaintiff in payment for the plaintiff's draft on its correspondent in St. Paul which latter draft was sent to Montana as
the defendant's remittance in payment of the draft issuing from
there on the defendant's customer. Then the defendant dishonored the customer's check above mentioned and held the items
deposited by the customer to cover his earlier indebtedness to it.
It was held that the defendant bank was liable to the plaintiff
bank for the amount of the check. The South Dakota court frankly says that there was not and could not be an acceptance in this
case under the Negotiable Instruments Law because of the lack of
writing but apparently has not hesitated in finding the defendant
liable to the plaintiff on the theory of estoppel.
Now these cases seem to indicate the existence of a rule of
law to the effect that one who has received from another a consignment or deposit of money, goods or credit, knowing that a
draft has been drawn upon him against such deposit or consign35(1920) 42 S. D. 585, 176 N. W. 646.
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ment or credit by the depositor or consignor thereof, and who
deals with it in such terms as to repudiate the absolute right of the
depositor or consignor to its disposal or control, is liable to the
holder of the draft, who has acquired the same in due course.
(Query, whether such holder of the draft must have parted with
value or otherwise changed his position in reliance upon an actual
or implied representation of the drawee that such draft would be
paid?) It further appears -to be necessary that the drawee of the
draft should be aware of the existence of the draft at the time of
his dealing with the proceeds in a manner inconsistent with the
36
absolute right of the consignor.
In Minnesota, where the general doctrine has been most emphatically enunciated, the necessity of this notice is made the basis
of the decision in Live Stock State Bank v. Hise.7 This was
decided before the McCluwsky Bank Case. Here the drawee of the
bill of exchange had shipped certain cattle to the drawee for sale
to the credit of the shipper-drawer. They were sold by the drawee
but he did not at the time have notice of the draft. He was garnished by a creditor of the drawer and the dispute is between this
garnisher and the holder of the draft. The court decided that
there was no implied acceptance of the draft as against the garnishing creditor and hence, as the drawee got notice of the garnishment before he learned of the draft, the garnishor is entitled to
collect that the drawee holds as proceeds of the shipment and the
drawee is not bound to pay the draft. Again in Hoven v. Leedham3s we have a cattle shipment case in which the same result is
reached on the same reasoning. In this case the court pointed out
the circumstance that the drawee "had no notice of the draft and
had the right to act as though none had been issued."3 9
36
It must be remembered that this has not been universally so held
as indicated by Johnson v. Clark, (1898) 20 Ind. App. 247, 50 N. E.
762, stated at length in text and footnotes 23 and 24, and other cases;
for example, see Kaesemeyer v. Smith, (1912) 2 Idaho 1, 123 Pac. 943,
43 L. R A. (N.S.) 100.
97(1921) 150 Minn. 301, 185 N. W. 498.
08(1922)
153 Minn. 95, 189 N. W. 601, 31 A. L. R. 574.
3
9It
seems to be settled, therefore, in Minnesota at least, that the
drawee of the draft in the class of cases under consideration must have
actual knowledge of the draft or be chargeable with notice of its
existence. Is he so charged with notice as to make him liable in the
absence of actual knowledge? In the McClusky Bank Case, (1922)
151 Minn. 243, 186 N. W. 575; in Carlson v. Stafford, (1926) 166 Minn.
481, 208 N. W. 413, and in First State Bank of Lemon v. Stockmen's
State Bank of Faith, (1920) 42 S. D. 585, 176 N. W. 646, there was
actual knowledge of the draft on the part of the drawee before he
dealt with the proceeds of the consignment or deposit as his own, or

ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS BY CONDUCT

Now to come down to the reasons for the rule which these
cases seem to lay down. Is this good law? Is it better law and
justice that where the drawee of a draft has been put in possession
of the drawer's property, that the proceeds should go to the holder
of the draft which draft was known by the drawee to exist or to
some antecedent creditor of the drawer, either the drawee himself
or some other?
Now on what theory of law is the drawee in fact held liable
to the holder of the unaccepted draft? This raises several questions viz.,
1. Is the drawee liable as acceptor of the draft?
a. At Common law.
b. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
2. If he is not liable as acceptor, is he liable on any other
principle?
3. If the Negotiable Instruments Law makes it impossible to
treat the drawee as acceptor in such cases, does the statute
also forbid that he should be held liable on other principles?
4. Does it make any practical difference whether the drawee
in such a case is held liable as acceptor or on other premises
of law, siz., would it for example make any difference in
the measure of damages?
5. Should the- Negotiable Instruments Law be amended?
The McClusky Bank Case seems to put the drawee's liability
on two theories. It is rather hard to tell whether the court would
have been ready to reach the decision it did in the particular case
on one of them alone. The first theory suggested by the court
was that this was an equitable assignment. Its other theory was
that,
"If one to whom goods are consigned for sale receives the
consignment with notice that the consignor has made a draft on
him on the credit of the goods, he is bound to accept the draft.
He may not retain the consignment with such notice and repudiate
the draft. The acceptance of the goods is deemed the equivalent
of a promise to accept the draft."
before other creditors' claims were presented to him. In the contrary
Indiana case there was knowledge of the draft, perhaps not before

the receipt of the cattle, but at least before their sale and before that
dealing with the proceeds which repudiated the draft.
In Ballard v. Home National Bank, (1913)

91 Kan. 91, 136 Pac. 935,

L. R. A. 1916C 161, which is in accord with the Minnesota cases, there
was only the word "mules" written on the checks which were written

by the mule buyer and upon which the defendant was held liable.
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Later in the opinion the court says "Strictly speaking, the consignee is not charged with liability on the draft but on the contract
implied from his acts."
After all then, we have an equitable assignment,40 or else the court
is laying down a rule that the drawee is liable for the amount of
the draft to the holder thereof because he has done those things
which make him liable,-but why? It does not seem to have any
practical effect upon the drawee's posifion to say that strictly
speaking he is not liable an the draft. If we are to take this second theory as a workable rule of law it would seem to require
further explanation. On its face the statement of the Minnesota
court does in a sense seem to beg the question. On first blush it
violates section 132 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
says that the acceptarqce must be in writing. And if we turn for
help to the last sentence in the portion of the opinion dealing with
this theory of the case, viz, "The acceptance of the goods is deemed
the equivalent of a promise to accept," we are then confronted
with section 134 of the Negotiable Instruments Law41 and with
section 135, which deal with acceptances not on the paper and
promises to accept but which refer to them as written and provide
that the holder relying on this means of holding the drawee must
have taken the instrument in reliance on such promise to accept
"in writing."
Therefore, leaving aside for the moment, equitable assignment, these cases holding liable the drawee of a draft not formally
accepted in writing must be explained by some reason outside the
specific provisions of the statute, and, it would seem, by some
reasons sufficiently cogent to overcome the at least apparently
contrary provisions of the statute. It would seem to be necessary
to show that there is some such concept of law whcih might be
called "constructive acceptance" or "implied acceptance" applicable to such cases and that it exists quite independently of section
137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which limits this concept
to a particular act upon the part of the drawee.
4OFor a discussion of this case and some others dealt with in this
paper, from the standpoint of assignment, see Aigler, Rights of Holder
of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 862 et
seq. A recent Minnesota case applying the theory of equitable assignment is Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Bank, (Minn. 1927) 214
N. W. 750.

4'Sfction 134 reads: "Where an acceptance is written on a paper
other than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in
favor of a person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith thereof,
receives the bill for value."
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Apparently, constructive acceptance was a recognized thing in
the law of bills and notes before the Negotiable Instruments Law
as being of wider scope than section 137 now provides for and
apparently still is recognized notwithstanding the Negotiable Instruments Law in some of the cases which have been stated in the
last few pages.
In the South Dakota case of First State Bank of Lemmon v.
Stock en's State Bank of Faith, the court expresses the same
conclusion reached in Minnesota but in slightly different terms.
The South Dakota court says that there was no acceptance because
an acceptance must be in writing under the Negotiable Instruments Law and that liability is not based on a true acceptance but
on estoppel.4 2 It is suggested that in the other cases herein stated
the courts were thinking in terms of estoppel but apparently hesitated to use the word. In other words, the drawee of a bill of
exchange who has got goods, credits, etc., knowing that there is
an outstanding draft which is intended to be met out of the proceeds of such goods or what not, will be treated as liable to the
holder of the draft just as though he has accepted it. This is not
because .he has in fact done so but because justice requires that
he be presumed to have accepted it and because there are present
the elements of an estoppel. Thus we have what may be called
an implied or constructive acceptance.43
This theory of course makes it necessary to find the elements
of estoppel in the case. The drawee must have made a representation; the payee or other holder of the draft must have
changed his position relying on it. In the cases which have held
the drawee liable there has been emphasis on the drawee's notice
of the draft's existence. Where there-has not been actual notice
of the existence of the particular draft, there has been acquiescence
in a custom by which the drawee is charged with notice and out
of this he has been made responsible for the representation, arising
out of the fact of the drawing and negotiation of the instrument
by the drawer thereof, that the authority to do so existed. Change
42The language of the Minnesota court to the effect that the
liability of the defendant in the McClusky Bank Case while equivalent
to that of an acceptor was on a different theory had already been
referred to, and in Carlson v. Stafford, (Minn. 1927) 218 N. W. 413,
stated in text at note 25, the court frankly talked in terms of estoppel.
43
See 2 Joyce, Defenses to Commercial Paper 1049 quoting from
the case of Dumbeck v. Walgh, (1913) 179 Ili. App. 239. "So an
oral acceptance may under certain conditions operate as an estoppel
of the acceptor to deny such acceptance and render him liable for the
payment of the bill or order."
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of position by the plaintiff or one under whom he claims title, is
of course necessary in an estoppel and this of course only exists
where the paper was negotiated for value to one without notice of
any facts which would limit the apparent authority of the drawer
to make the draft."4
If situations like this may be accepted as sufficient to make
out an estoppel, we may say as to the questions put on page 141.
1. The drawee is not liable as acceptor of the draft under the

provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It is to avoid
the unfortunately strict wording of the Negotiable Instruments
Law that this (perhaps too attenuated) reasoning of some of the
cases comes to be used. At common law he could be held liable

and there was no serious logical reason for not treating him frankly
as an acceptor.
2. He is liable in some jurisdictions upon a sort of constructive

acceptance explained by the courts by reference to the concepts
either of equitable assignment or estoppel.
3. The question is whether the statute intends to limit or prevent the drawee of a bill of exchange from being held liable in

such situations as we are here considering. Is it simply one of the
many situations which were not specifically provided for in the
Negotiable Instruments Law and are left to the saving language
4It has often been stated that "Authority to draw a bill is an implied agreement for acceptance on the part of the drawee who gives
the authority." For collection of authorities see 8 C. J. 316 note 76 and
again, "By the law merchant such authority amounts to an acceptance
if definite and certain and known to and relied on by the holder in,
purchasing the draft." This statement from Corpus Juris refers to the
necessity that the authority be definite and certain but elsewhere it
adds that a promise to accept may be implied from the relationship of
the parties and the usages of trade.
A recent federal case is important as suggesting a situation in
which custom may be sufficient to charge the drawee of a draft with
liability as acceptor. In Furness, Withy & Co. v. Rothe, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1923) 286 Fed. 870, 27 A. L. R. 1185 the master of a Norwegian.
vessel drew on the owners for the purchase of coal for fuel. The
draft was deposited by the coal dealer in his local bank and sent
through the usual channels for collection. rt was dishonored by nonacceptance on the part of the drawee for reasons arising out of a
misunderstanding as to the rate of exchange to be applied in the particular transaction. The drawee was held liable in the federal court in
this country and in the opinion it was said, "When the drawer makes
a draft on himself, or authorL-es another to draw. on him that is a
virtual acceptance and he is liable as drawee without formal acceptance." The "authority to draw" in this case was .established to the
satisfaction of the court by evidence of a custom for ship-masters
to draw upon their owners for necessary supplies, the court saying,
"No contrary instructions being shown, the owner is liable to accept
and pay the draft."
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of section 196? (In any case not provided for in this act the rules
of the law merchant shall govern).
4. By virtue of the nature of estoppel the measure of damages
is the same in these cases where the drawer is held liable as if he
were an actual acceptor, and such has been the measure of damages
imposed in these cases.
5. If substantial justice has been achieved in a number of
cases in several jurisdictions as illustrated, in view of the great
difficulty in securing the passage of any suggested amendment in
all the states at approximately the same time, it would seem unwise to attempt an amendment of the law in this respect. It should
be remembered that it was over twenty-five years from the time
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was first proposed for
adoption until it was finally enacted by the last of the states.
There should be no attempts to tinker with the substantial statutory uniformity we now have, at least until they have been widely
discussed and there is an articulate expression of the probability
that proposed changes will be adopted by most of the state legislatures practically contemporaneously.
Notwithstanding what has been stated just above, the conclusion is submitted that for the most part cases of the sort here presented go too far in imposing liability on the drawee in the absence
of a written acceptance. Substantial justice has doubtless been
done in the majority of such cases, but they cannot in most instances be satisfactorily explained in the face of the statute by any
such generalizations as the courts have made about the drawee
being liable on a draft of which he knows or ought to know,
simply because he has got the goods against which the draft was
drawn (for after all that is the question to which we are seeking
an answer and not an answer itself). Moreover these cases cannot all be explained on the basis of estoppel. It is too difficult to
show that the representations acted upon by the plaintiff or his indorser can be imputed to the defendant drawee upon whom liability
is sought to be imposed. The representation to the payee or other
purchaser of the draft, if there is any such representation, must
be that which is made by the drawer in executing and negotiating
the instrument. But there is no privity by which the drawee can
ordinarily be connected with this, until he has actually accepted the
draft. On the other hand, where there is a true estoppel, there
seems to be nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Law which
would specifically enough indicate any intent on the part of its
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authors so to change the previously existing rules of law, that the
holder is prohibited from taking advantage of it. Probably, however, it is only in those cases where there is clearly shown an
authority from the defendant to draw this particular draft and
such authority is known to the person through whom the plaintiff
claims title that we can properly impute the essential representation
to the drawee. Without this of course it is impossible to work
out a true estoppel.
Now it does seem that substantial justice demands that the
drawee should pay in such cases as have been made prominent
in these pages. But is it worth while to make the effort to secure
modification of the Negotiable Instruments Law in all our many
states, even in view of the non-uniformity on this point now existing?45
'45At the 1927 meeting of the Commissioners on Uniform Law

there were presented a number of proposed amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law prepared by Professor Samuel Williston of
the Harvard Law School and it is not improbable that the commissioners will proceed to bring in a proposed amended act at an early
meeting.

